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ABSTRACT 
Talk about global democracy seems to be fixated on a Reform-Act 
model of democracy, with 'one person one vote for all affected by 
the decisions' as for example in a second popularly-apportioned 
chamber of UN.  Politically, that seems wildly unrealistic.  But 
remember that the Reform Acts came very late in process of 
democratization domestically.  The first steps in the beginning that 
eventually led to full democratization of that sort were:  a) limiting 
the arbitrary rule on the part of the sovereign; and (b) making the 
sovereign accountable to others (initially a limited set of others, 
which then expanded).  Globally, there are moves afoot globally in 
both those directions.  And once those pieces are in place, there are 
good reasons for expecting the circle of accountability basically 
only to expand and virtually never to contract. 
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 When we think of democracy nowadays, we tend to think of it primarily in 
terms  of ʹ one  person  one  voteʹ  –  and  perhaps  (if  weʹre  particularly 
sophisticated) ʹ one  vote  one  valueʹ.  We  tend  to  think  in  terms  of 
enfranchising all affected interests.  For reasons that will become apparent, I 
will call that the ʹReform‐Act model of democracyʹ, in honour of nineteenth 
century  British  expansions  of  the  franchise.1  The  Reform‐Act  model  of 
democracy  is,  at  root,  an  electorally‐oriented,  vote‐centric  vision  of  what 
democracy is all about. 
  Academic  political  theorists  are  of  course  infinitely  subtle.  When 









founded  under  Reagan  and  still  much  in  favour.  In  its ʹ Statement  of 
Principles  and  Objectivesʹ,  the  first  thing  it  says  under  the  heading  of 




Recall  how  Jimmy  Carter,  arguably  Americaʹs  last  remotely  left‐wing 
president, spent his post‐White House years.  When awarding him the Peace 
                                                 
1 More in principle than in practice, of course:  only a small proportion of the population was 
actually enfranchised by those acts; what those acts really did was establish the 
principle that would be progressively implemented over the next century. 





democratic  governance,  ...  a  preoccupation  with  elections  is  a  striking 
featureʹ.4  As one pair of distinguished commentators wryly say, ʹto raise the 
question  of  democracy  in  international  law  [just]  is  largely  to  raise  the 
question [of] whether international law requires states to hold periodic and 
genuine elections.ʹ5
The  same  Reform‐Act  emphasis  on  fully‐enfranchised  electoral 





The  most  common  suggestion  along  those  lines  nowadays  is  for  a 
Second  Assembly  of  the  UN,  apportioned  according  to  population,  as  a 
                                                 
3 Norwegian Nobel Committee 2002.  Carter's activities in support of democracy were only 
one aspect of his more general human rights promotion that were grounds for the 
award. 
4 Crawford and Marks (1998, p. 80), referring to arguments such as those in Franck (1992) 
5 Crawford & Marks 1998, p. 80. 
6 By which I mean 'people who believed in strong international institutions'.  They contrast 
with 'weak internationalists' who prefer strong states linked through international 
institutions with only weak authority.  They also contrast with 'anti-statists' who 
eschew strong institutions, national or international, in favour of a strong civil 
society.  Much of the current discussion of global democracy is among theorists of 
vaguely that latter persuasion (Gould 2004; Kuper 2004; Dryzek 2006; Bohman 1999; 
2007), although strong internationalists see an important role for strengthening global 
civil society as well (Held 1995, ch. 12; Falk 2000).  By incorporating NGOs and others 
more closely into the work of the UN General Assembly and Economic and Security 
Council, the Boutros-Ghali Agenda for Democratization (1996, sec. 77-103) contributed, 
fitfully, to that process. 
7 Speech in the House of Commons, 23 Nov 1945.  Strictly speaking, all he said was that 'there 








attracted  the  support  from  a  bevy  of  NGOs,  from  the  United  Nations 












•[safeguards  against]  attempts  to  manipulate  or  undermine 
elections....13
                                                 
8 But see Patomäki and Teivainen (2004) for the wide array of other proposals for 
democratizing global institutions that have been floated. 
9 Segall 1982; 1991. 
10 Preeminent among the NGOs are the International Network for a UN Second Assembly 
(INFUSA) and its spin-off the Campaign for a Democratic United Nations 
(CAMDUN).  UNDP's endorsement came in the 1999 Human Development Report. 
11 Falk & Strauss 2001.  See similarly:  Franck 1995, p. 483; Held 1992; 1995, pp. 273-4; 1998, p. 
25; Galtung 2000, pp. 156-8; Patomäki annd Teivainen 2004, pp. 30-3 and ch. 8. 
12 Falk & Strauss 2001, p. 217. 
13 Falk & Strauss 2000, p. 219. Held (1995, p. 273) similarly says, 'The establishment of an 
independent [UN] assembly of democratic peoples, directly elected by them and 
 3 
Clearly,  what  they  are  proposing  amounts  to  nothing  short  of  a ʹ Global 
Reform Actʹ. 
As  an  ultimate  goal,  that  is  one  with  which  I  have  considerable 
sympathy.  Philosophically, enfranchising all affected interests surely is the 
right way of constituting the demos from a democratic point of view.14  And 
in  todayʹs  world,  just  about  everyone  is  potentially  affected  by  just  about 
everyoneʹs decisions and choices, in ways that ought entitle them to a say in 







Now,  generally  I  am  pretty  skeptical  about  the  claims  of  self‐styled 
realists.  They tend to be too realistic – too quick to fold their highest moral 
                                                                                                                                            
accountable to them, is an unavoidable institutional requirement' of cosmopolitan 
democracy. 
14 Or so I argue elsewhere (Goodin 2007; cf. Gould 2004, ch. 7). 
15 There are also, of course, doubts whether it is desirable at all:  many share Kant's (1795) 
concern with what might happen if we instituted a global government that then 
turned dictatorial. 
16 Nye 2001, p. 4, referring to a line from Tennyson's 'Locksley Hall'.  See further: Dahl 1999; 
Keohane and Nye 2002.  Even sensible critical theorists agree.  Commenting on the 
Habermasian ideal, Scheuerman (2006, pp. 95-6) writes:  'If applied to the global 
arena, this normative ideal would probably have revolutionary consequences.  It 
seems to require the reconfiguration of global and economic power so that every one 
of the planet's billions of inhabitants might possess equal and uncoerced chances to 
determine, via free-wheeling deliberation resulting in a binding rule, the character of 
any decision influencing his or her activities....  [But i]mmediate problems present 
themselves to defenders of this approach.  It seems fundamentally utopian given 
present economic and political conditions.  Can anyone really imagine the United 
States peacefully surrendering its dominant military position within the international 
state system, or for that matter the privileged rich countries acceding to a 
fundamental global redistribution of economic resources?  Thus far, they have 
aggressively resisted even relatively modest (and relatively inexpensive) efforts to 
reduce global starvation.'  Habermas  (2001, pp. 107-9) agrees. 










It  should  be  no  cause  for  despair  that  we  are  not  (yet)  in  a  position  to 




                                                 
17 Goodin 1992.  As Edvard Hambro put it during his time as president of the UN General 
Assembly, 'Politics should be the art to make possible tomorrow what seems 
impossible today' (quoted in Kuper 2004, p. 45). Or as Weber (1919/2004, p. 93) says 
at the end of his lecture on 'Politics as a vocation':  'Politics means a slow, powerful 
drilling through hard boards, with a mixture of passion and a sense of proportion.  It 
is absolutely true, and our entire historical experience confirms it, that what is 
possible could never have been achieved unless people had tried again and again to 
achieve the impossible in this world.'  
18 Although the Commission on Global Governance's (Carlson and Ramphal 1995, ch. 7) 
proposal for a 'Forum of Civil Society' representing NGOs accredited to the General 
Assembly is getting some traction, with backing from UN Secretaries General and 
various panels of eminent persons (Boutrol-Ghali 1996; Annan 2002, paras 134-41; 
Cardozo 2004; Panyarachun 2004, para. 243).   
19 Some places – conspicuously including the American South – it took another century to 
realize the Reform Act ideal fully, of course. 
20 There is of course a chicken-and-egg issue of democratic legitimacy, here.  The only way to 
make international institutions democratic is to cede some power to them and then 
hold them increasingly to account for how they exercise it.  But in the very first 
instance, before they yet very democratically accountable, that amounts (at least for 
countries that are themselves genuinely democratic in their internal governance) to 
transferring power from a more democratic regime to a less democratic one (Rabkin 
2005).  I would myself regard that as a 'democracy-democracy tradeoff', i.e., trading 
less democracy now for more in the future.  Even in the short term, working through 
international (or even just multilateral) regimes can help in important ways to make 
domestic regimes that are all inevitably imperfectly democratic more democratic 
(Keohane, Macedo and Moravcsik 2007). 
 5the end of the dayʹ (the ʹend of historyʹ, if anyone still believes Fukuyama21).  
Instead,  we  should  be  looking  at  how  democracy  developed ʹ in  the 







Pulling  ourselves  out  of  that  nineteenth‐century  Reform‐Act  mindset,  and 





•The  second  was  rendering  power‐holders  accountable  to  someone  or 
another.24
  Of course, the way in which we eventually came to curb the arbitrary 
exercise  of  power  was  to  make  power  holders  accountable.  So  nowadays 
those two steps have come to be conflated.  But note well:  that was a later 
                                                 
21 Fukuyama 2006. 
22 A trick that Hui (2001) taught me. 
23 Young (2000, p. 174), following Shapiro (1996, p. 582; 1999, ch. 1), chastises 'recent political 
theory for concentrating on only one aspect of democracy, that of collective self-
government.  Once we thematize democratic politics as involving some separation 
between people and power, we must attend to another function of democracy, 
namely to oppose the arbitrary exercise of power.' 
24 The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights identified precisely these two 
requirements in its 1990 Report on Haiti: 'The concept of representative democracy is 
rooted in the principle that political sovereignty is vested in the people which, in the 
exercise of that sovereignty, elects its representatives to exercise political power.... 
The effective enjoyment of these rights and freedoms requires a legal and 
institutional order in which the law takes precedence over the will of the rulers and 
some institutions have control over others in order to preserve the integrity of the 






  Once  it  was  established  as  a  matter  of  principle  that  the  sovereign 
could  not  exercise  power  in  any  arbitrary  way  he  (or  occasionally  she) 
pleased, discussion could then turn to questions of how best to embed that 








Notice  first  of  all  that  having  reasons  (which  is  all  that  non‐
arbitrariness requires) is logically distinct from giving reasons.27  As a purely 
contingent matter, it may well be true that requiring people to give reasons 
through  some  accountability  mechanism  may  be  the  best  practical  way  of 
                                                 
25 Starting with Bracton and his famous slogan 'law makes the king', rather than the other way 
around (quoted in Corwin 1928-9/1955, p. 27).  See further: Pocock 1957, esp. ch. 2;  
Jennings 1959, ch. 1; Holt 1965; Berman 1983, pp. 292-4. 
26 True, the Magna Carta itself provided, in clause 61, for 'an assembly of barons to secure 
amends from the royal estate for any transgressions denounced but not corrected 
within forty days'.  Whitehead (2002, p. 92, n.3) sees this as a key step toward 
'executive accountability', and in some sense of course it is.  Note however that clause 
61 only applies to cases in which 'we [i.e. the king], or our justiciar, should be out of 
the kingdom' (as translated by Holt 1965, p. 335).  Of course, establishing 
accountability mechanisms even for so special a case was important as a first step 
toward systematic accountability of the sovereign, but the full realization of that ideal 
did not come until the Bill of Rights of 1689. 
27 Another way to phrase this is as a distinction between non-arbitrariness as 'a guarantee of 
not doing wrong' (or anyway not doing something for no legitimate reason at all) 
versus accountability as 'a guarantee of doing right'. 
 7ensuring that they actually have reasons, and that that they are actually acting 

















Meadow,  and  if  I  am  accountable  to  you  alone,  then  the  requirement  of 
accountability has been satisfied.  But non‐arbitrariness, I would argue, has 
not.  The fact that the same thing happens simultaneously to strike the fancy 
                                                 
28 Bracton, again, was clear on this point.  In McIlwain's ((1947, pp. 72, 82) gloss:  'The king is 
under no man (non sub homine), even if he is under God and the law....  Obviously, 
the king can do wrong, even if the penalty can, in Bracton's phrase, be exacted by 
none but God the avenger'.  Hobbes (1651, ch. 21) would have his sovereign say to 
God, 'to Thee only have I sinned', as David said to God after killing Uriah (II Sam. 
11).  For many years after the Magna Carta, that was precisely the case with British 
sovereigns:  requirements of non-arbitrariness and standards of 'wrong' were in 
place, but accountability mechanisms  (to any human agents, at least) were not. 
29 The point generalizes to the case in which everyone is accountable to everyone.  It could be 
a mere whim, universally shared.  The reasons we all have for doing something can 










contingent  facts  into  iron  laws  social  development,  treating  accidents  of 
British history as if they were necessarily true for all places and all times.31  
Doubtless Marshall did just that, to some extent or another (doubtless we are 









simply  lock  up  opposition  supporters  to  prevent  them  from  voting;  and 
giving people a right to demand that they be charged before a court of law is a 
guarantee  against  using  arbitrary  arrests  in  that  way  to  alter  election 
outcomes.  More generally, unless the sovereign is bound by the rule of law, 
                                                 
30 Marshall 1949/1963.  Even those who would 'start with rights', and who are anxious to 
have a robust human rights regime in place alongside majoritarian democracy, must 
recognize the preeminence of the 'rule of law'.  Only if that is in place will there be a 
venue in which rights claims could be heard.  
31 Somers 1994. 



























                                                 
















of  treaty  regimes  with  increasingly  strong  enforcement  mechanisms.  
Emblematic  of  this  is  the  shift  from  the  voluntary  dispute  settlement 
mechanism  found  in  the  General  Agreement  on  Trade  and  Tariffs  to  the 
mandatory one found in World Trade Organization.34  One could equally well 
point to the International Criminal Court as acknowledgment (at least among 
                                                 
33 Truman 1945.  Quoted in Annan 2006. 
34 PatomUaki and Teivainen 2004, p. 71.  Furthermore, it is no mystery why the shift has 
occurred:  it is in the interests even of the very strongest.  As Krasner (2000, p. 234) 
explains:  'Why did the United States, the most powerful country in the world, enter 
into an arrangement that involves a decision-making process with international 
panels whose jurisdiction cannot be denied?  Why not stay with the GATT process in 
which submission to the dispute settlement mechanism was voluntary and in which 
the US had more leeway to pursue regional and especially unilateral strategies 
through Section 301 actions against individual countries?... One answer is that the 
Clinton administration is infatuated with global governance and mandatory law-like 
international arrangements.  But an alternative and perhaps more persuasive 
explanation is that ... other countries might have been very, very leery about entering 
into arrangements in which theywould have remained vulnerable to unilateral action 
by the US that could not clearly be marked as violating the agreement.  In the area of 
trade broadly conceived, more law-like international arrangements... [are] in the 
interest of the United States.'  
 11the treatyʹs signatories) of norms of international law that are binding even on 
the notional sovereigns in the state system. 
  Treaty  regimes  are  just  the  formalized  tip  of  the  international  legal 
iceberg, however.  If our concern is with the emergence of norms curbing 
arbitrary exercises of power by state actors, an even better place to look might 




treaties  marks  a ʹ shift  from  consent  to  consensus  as  the  basic  source  of 
international lawʹ.35   
Thus,  in  addition  to  international  conventions  and  international 
custom, sources of international law also include ʹthe general principles of law 









                                                 
35 Although Bull (2002, pp. 150), whose phrase this is, himself doubts that sufficient 
international solidarity exists for that to be presently practicable.  I take May's (2005) 
point that grounding jus cogens in international custom, as is typically done in this 
literature, encounters the problem of the 'persistent objector':  why should a state be 
bound by the customary practices of or consensus among other states, when it has 
always objected to that custom or consensus?  It may well be that jus cogens must 
ultimately be grounded in universal moral norms, of the sort I shall discuss next. 
36 ICJ 2007, Art. 38.1.  As Brownlie (1990, p.3).says, this 'is generally recognized as a complete 
statement of the sources of international law'.   
37 Goodin 2005.  Archibugi and Young 2002.  The Report of the Special Representative of the 
UN Secretary-General on Business & Human Rights provides a most interesting 
discussion of how this expanding rule of law might even be stretched to make 
 12law‐giver.  Instead, the rule of law emerges out of customary international 




















                                                                                                                                            
business corporations responsible for respecting international human rights (Ruggie 
2007, pp. 14-18). 
38 Abbott and Snidal 2000.  Abbott et al 2000. 
39 That is the defining feature of a 'network externality':  it is more valuable for you to be 
connected to the network (e.g. the internet, or a telephone system) the more others 
who are already connected (Katz & Shapiro 1985; Grewal 2008, pp. 25 ff.). 
40 Assuming increasing marginal harm to the environment from each extra increment of 
pollution, the more other states curb their pollution the less important it is for your 
state to do so, for example. 
41 Reus-Smit 2003. 
42 Paraphrasing Andrew Jackson (Warren 1926, vol. 1, p. 759). 



























                                                 
44 McIlwain 1947, p. 69. 
45 Henkin 1968, p. 42.  Koh 1997. 
46 Attributed to Bracton, although it was almost certainly a latter annotation.  Ibid. 
 14  The  basic  idea  there  was  one  of  mutual  accountability  among 






all ʹ create  and  maintain  transnational  norms  to  which  NGOs,  IGOs  and 
government officials can be judged accountableʹ.48  These networks involve 
non‐state  actors  ranging  from ʹ international  NGOs  such  as  Amnesty 













                                                 
47 This is sometimes called 'peer accountability (Grant and Keohane 2005), 'horizontal 
accountability' (Bovens 2007) or 'horizontal responsiveness' (Kuper, 2004, p.  103).  
While this is the form of accountability I emphasize here, there are of course several 
other sorts of accountability at work in world politics that are surveyed in Grant and 
Keohane (2005). 
48 Keohane and Nye 2002, pp. 239-40. 
49 Scott, 2002, p.  60. 
50 Kreps 1990.  See further Sørensen and Torfing (2007). 












To  a  hard‐bitten  realist,  all  that  may  seem  pretty  airy‐fairy.  Such 
skepticism notwithstanding, that is precisely how networks do often work.  
Gunnar  Myrdal  was  Executive  Secretary  of  the  United  Nationʹs  Economic 







the  same  state  officials  come  together  at  regular  intervals....  
Certain substitutes for real political sanctions can then gradually 
be built up.  They are all informal and frail.  They assume a 
commonly  shared  appreciation  of  the  general  usefulness  of 
earlier  results  reached,  the  similarly  shared  pride  of,  and 
solidarity towards, the ʹclubʹ of participants at the meetings, and 
                                                 
52 Cardoso 2004, p. 33, para. 51. 
53 March and Olsen, 1995:  ch. 2. 
 16a  considerable  influence  of  the  civil  servants  on  the  home 
governments in the particular kind of questions dealt with in the 












Organized  crime  and  terrorist  cells  work  through  networks  of  mutual 
accountability.  And  climate‐change  deniers  find  plenty  of  governments, 
NGOs and IGOs to bundle into an effective network of mutual accountability 
for their own nefarious purposes.  But the same was historically true in the 
domestic  case:  the  kingʹs  curia  often  constituted  a  conspiracy  against  the 
interests of the larger public lacking a seat in that chamber. 
  And of course, the agents and agencies to whom todayʹs international 






                                                 
54 Myrdal 1955, 8, 20.   
55 Esmark 2007. 
 17the UN and EU, both of whom enter in formal consultative relationships only 






If  the  analogies  I  have  been  suggesting  are  valid,  democratization  of  the 










                                                 
56  The UN Economic and Social Council (1996,  § 12) establishes 'consultative relations' with 
non-governmental organizations only on this condition: 'The organization shall have 
a representative structure and possess appropriate mechanisms of accountability to 
its members, who shall exercise effective control over its policies and actions through 
the exercise of voting rights or other appropriate democratic and transparent 
decision-making processes.'  See similarly the White Paper on European Governance of 
the European Union's Commission (2001, pp. 4, 16-17).  The UN Panel of Eminent 
Persons, however, recommends 'removing those restrictions' so as to 'open the 
United Nations to vital contributions from other constituencies and increase their 
sense of ownership of global goals' (Cardoso 2004, p. 32, para. 41). 
57 We have only pretty sketchy outlines of available 'transition paths' toward democratization 
domestically (Linz and Stepan 1996, ch. 4). The pace of global democratization need 
not be as slow as it historically was, domestically, however:  that the ideas are 
already well-established at some other level of governance might (or might not) make 
global democratization easier to bring about more quickly. 
58 I think of this more as a projection than either a prediction or, still less, a prescription 
(pleased though democrats should be if the projected outcome eventuates). 
59 Wary though we must always be of false analogies, extending the domestic to the 
international (Suganami 1989). 


















                                                 
60 Acemoglu and Robinson (2000)  offer empirical evidence, Meyerson (2008) an elegant 
formal model. 
61  'John Stuart Mill looked forward in October 1831 to a time when "the whole of the existing 
institutions of society are leveled with the ground".  After the first reformed 
Parliament "the ground will be cleared", he wrote.  ....  The Poor Man's Guardian 
announced on 26 May: "We cannot think so ill of human nature as to think that those 
who will... have gained their own freedom will not aid us to gain ours.'   But as it 
turned out, 'Middle-class people, once given the vote, wanted to conserve institutions 
which they had formerly been inclined to attack.  Most of the new voters wanted, not 
to challenge the aristocracy, but to win recognition from it:  once they had their 
rightful position they did not favour further adventures' (Brock 1973, pp. 315, 319). 
62 Wars and the need for support during them is a notable one:  during World War I the 
German Emperor had to make his peace with trade unions and social democrats, on 
the grounds that 'in a castle under siege you have to see to it that everything inside it 
is harmonious'.  Similarly, economic elites eventually come to see the benefits of 
giving the working classes the vote, 'institutionalizing class struggle' within the 
political realm and thus removing it from the economic (Lipset 1963). 
63 The usefulness of the franchise might contract, as for example when state power ekes out 
into the market under regimes of neoliberal economic reform. 
 19Of course, we can think of exceptions.64  Perhaps the most glaring was 
the  way  blacks  in  the  American  South  won  voting  rights  during 
Reconstruction, only to lose them again once the federal forces withdrew.  But 
that  is  very  much  the  exception  that  proves  the  rule.  Historians  of  that 
episode are emphatic on that point, one going so far as to say: 














                                                 
64 My focus here is narrowly on political rights, and more narrowly still (in this paragraph 
anyway) on voting rights.  Thinking of rights more generally, there certainly has been 
a certain amount of ebb and flow over time:  just think of the status of women's rights 
in Iran and Pakistan, for example. 
65 The French revolution enfranchised many people who were subsequently disenfranchised – 
but given the character of the new regime, that was not by even 'nominally 
democratic means'.  
66 Valelly 2004, pp. 1-2.  See further: Therborn 1977; Freeman and Snidal 1982; Mackie and 
Rose 1991. 
67 There are other smaller-scale instances:  for example, convicted felons are often 
disenfranchised sometimes for life, with racially differentiated consequences in the 
US (Western 2006); and commonwealth citizens resident in the UK enjoyed voting 
rights there until they were withdrawn by the Immigration Act of 1972.   




















democratization  is  basically  a  one‐way  process,  and  the  circle  of 
accountability only expands and almost never contracts, then institutions will 
over  time  become  increasingly  democratic  even  with  only  very  weak 
pressures in that direction.  
                                                 
68 This is a special case of Alastair MacIntyre's (1972) 'general theory of holes'.  Claus Offe 
wryly replies, 'Of course elites will try to build a fence around it...' Try as they might, 
they will not always succeed; and all this model requires is that there be occasional 
gaps in the fence. 
69 Lipset 1960.  Jackman 1972.  Geddes 1999. 
70 War, xenophobia and repression are other ways, from time to time.  I do not deny that they 
will sometimes be used, with brutal effect.  I merely claim that they are not enduring 
and cumulative, in the way that democratic reforms tend to be. 
 21  So why should that be so?  I would point to three mechanisms – one 
cultural, one psychological and one sociological – that work hand‐in‐glove to 












  I  am  talking  here  about  dynamics  within  democratic  systems  of 
governance.  My point is merely that those three mechanisms make it hard for 
a  system  that  remains  even ʹ nominally  democraticʹ  to  reduce  the  range  of 
people to whom power holders are democratically accountable.  But of course 
there  can  be  a  breakdown  of  the  democratic  system  altogether.74  Though 
revolution or counterrevolution, invasion or coup, democratic institutions can 
be suspended and replaced with others (or in the case of ʹfailed statesʹ, with 
none).  Clearly  in  those  cases,  the  cumulative  progress  toward  expanding 
democratic accountability unravels.75
  I do not suppose there is any predicting what the future might hold for 
catastrophically  failed  states,  or  even  for  ones  suffering  long  periods  of 
                                                 
71 Bradley 1876.  Shklar 1991. 
72 Kahneman and Tversky 1979; Tversky and Kahneman 1991. 
73 Tilly 1997.  McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001. 
74 Linz and Stepan 1978.    
75 Valelly (2004, p. 2) conceded that 'disenfranchisements certainly took place...when the type 










The  old  constitution  is  typically  restored,  typically  without  further 






than  the  Weimar  constitution,  for  example,  since  Article  21  empowers  the 
Constitutional  Court  to  ban  political  parties  for  being  anti‐democratic.79  
Accordingly, I phrase my generalization in weasel‐worded terms, saying the 
                                                 
76 It took millenia to restore democracy in Athens. 
77 That is clearly the case where democracy is restored under the old constitution that the 
coup suspended.  But it is also most typically the case in 'successor states' that are not 
official continuers of some previous one.  This is certainly true at the level of basic 
policy structures, anyway:  the same basic social insurance structure, for example, 
persisted in Germany from Bismarck through the Nazi period to the FRG and the 
DDR; Heidenheimer, Heclo and Adams (1990, p. 231) rightly say this continuity 
'remarkable... in light of the vast upheavals in twentieth-century Germany'. 
78 The generalization is only meant to apply to instances of indigenous, not externally-
imposed, democratization.  When a conqueror imposes democratic forms that have 
no domestic roots in the country upon which they are imposed, it is less uncommon 
for those forms to be repudiated when the conqueror departs.  The post-
Reconstruction history of the American South – blacks gaining the vote under 
Reconstruction but losing it again as soon as federal troops departed – is a case in 
point.  Another is the racially-restricted franchise introduced as the Union of South 
Africa gained independence from Britain. 
















Let  me  close  with  some  reflections  on  a  point  of  disanalogy  between 
democratizing domestic institutions and international ones.   





we  define  democratization  in  terms  of ʹ a  transfer  of  sovereignty  from  the 
                                                 
80 Linz and Stepan (1996, p. 17) for example say that 'without a state, no modern democracy is 
possible'. 
81 All democracies are 'successor states', as is clear from the large literature on democratic 
transition and consolidation (Linz and Stepan 1996).  Global democracy would have 
to be 'self-founding', which is something much harder.  I am grateful to Claus Offe 






order.  Maybe  the  king  could  claim  a  territory,  but  what  the  putative 





there  are  many.  These  institutions  exercise  global  authority  in  piecemeal 
fashion, functionally defined.  But whoever said – whoever would think – that 
only  central  authorities  with  a  perfectly  general  remit  admit  of  being 
democratized?  Notwithstanding its functionally delimited scope of authority, 





                                                 
82 Goodhart 2007, p. 574. 
83 Nage (2005, p. 146) puts this point particularly forcefully:  'Unjust and illegitimate regimes 
are the necessary precursors of ... progress toward legitimacy and democracy, 
because they create the centralized power that can then be contested, and perhaps 
turned in other directions without being destroyed.  For this reason, I believe the 
most likely path toward some version of global justice is through the creation of 
patently unjust and illegitimate global institutions of power that are tolerable to the 
interests of the most powerful current nation-states.  Only in that way will 
institutions come into being that are worth taking over in the service of more 
democratic purposes, and only in that way will there be something concrete for the 
demand for legitimacy to go to work on.' 
84 Minimalist proposals for democratizing WTO include measures for greater transparency 
(restricting access to fewer documents, opening WTO meetings to the public, etc.) 







some  strong  central  authority,  and  we  democratize  it,  we  end  up  with  a 
strong democratic institution.  If we have only weak central authorities with 




democratizing  institutions  paves  the  way  for  strengthening  those 
institutions.86  That was certainly the case with kings and parliaments.  Maybe 
it  will  be  so  with  global  institutions.  But  that  is  a  much  larger  story  for 
another occasion.87
                                                                                                                                            
rotating basis, in the group of Quad or in the work done in the Green Room).  For 
such proposals, see:  Krajewski 2001; Patomäki and Teivaninen 2004, pp. 83-4. 
85 Dahl and Tufte 1973. 
86 Having a robust 'global civil society' (the sorts of accountability networks discussed above) 
is a necessary but – pace some deliberative democrats (Gould 2004; Kuper 2004; 
Dryzek 2006; Bohman 2007) – not sufficient condition of robust global democracy.  
Ultimately, that will require more institutional structure. 
87 How to build global institutions, and to do so in a democratic fashion, is a large topic on 
which much has been written.  Roughly speaking, the options seem to be these.  First, 
you can rely on 'democratic politics from the outside' to hold international 
institutions that are not themselves internally democratic externally accountable to 
civil society (that is the NGO strategy of Transparency International et al.).  Second, 
you can run Marshall (1949) in reverse:  start with global welfare-state redistribution, 
which gives everyone reason to try to acquire civil and political rights to help shape 
its future of a regime in which they now have a stake.  Third, you could start by 
democratizing supranational regional organizations and expand from there, either 
through a 'demonstration' effect or through expanding the catchment of the regional 
organizations.  Fourth, you can try to expand the scope of nonpolitical, technical 
international policymaking, what Habermas calls 'global domestic policy making':  
policing (oceans, the drug market, protection of species, etc.) can be seen as a non-
political matter to be left to technical experts; being initially perceived as non-political 
allows transference of these responsibilities to an expert community worldwide; but 
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